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This study addresses the relationship between social capital and political 
action in the Middle East. The research uncovers indicators of how social capital 
correlates with democratic action. Using data from the 2005 World Values 
Survey, the examination centers on indicators of trust and membership in civic 
organizations and how they relate to political action in the region. The paper 
concludes with discussion of how trust-building and reciprocity can be interpreted 
within the political context of the Middle East, and how the relevance of social 
capital will be an unavoidable consideration in the transition away from autocracy 
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The examination of how, when, and where democracy thrives—or why it 
fails to ever take hold—has a central place in political theory. At certain points in 
the past decades, the suggested explanation came in the form of a single factor, 
such as high national income, that the wealthier nations of the world are more 
democratic, simply summarized (Lipset 1960). No single-serving explanation of 
why political action of the kind conducive to and characterized by popular 
democracy has appeared, though, at least not a conclusive one. As part of this 
long inquiry, many scholars have explored the concept of social cohesion and the 
function it serves within the overall structure of a democracy. The essential 
deduction is that the absence of a strong social fabric undermines political 
culture, thus weakening the foundations of a democracy (Fukuyama 2001). 
Conversely, the presence of a strong social structure can produce an ingredient 
that is considerably valuable to the potency of political culture: social capital.  
This concept engages a variety of ideas. It does not have a uniform, 
standard definition, but it does introduce a framework built around the basic idea 
of resources and expenditures, as it includes the key concept of “capital” as 
defined in the economic sense. These resources are identifiable at the individual 
level by the ideas of trust and reciprocity. Working upwards, social capital 
incorporates the idea of institutions, and the durability of the networks that 
facilitate the expenditure of social capital (Coleman 1988). These institutions also 
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relate to common practices, the societal ideals that trust and networks of social 
capital can tacitly influence, or as they may be called in a word, norms.  
Moreover, affixing the word capital to the study of social trust and 
cohesiveness brings in the possibility of theorizing how to invest in social capital, 
in a sense. It is in many ways a public good. Even though it obviously rests on 
the idea of a private expression of trust in others, it can be said that suboptimal 
levels of social capital might be considered as an area deserving investment, in 
the policy sense. Researchers have identified robust reserves of social capital as 
nearly indispensable with regards to the vigorous performance of a democracy. 
Greater levels of social capital have been shown to increase public safety, 
produce greater wealth, promote national levels of psychological well-being, and 
raise the quality of electoral competitiveness (Fedderke, Dekadt, and Luiz 1999; 
Portes, 1998 2000; Seligson 1999; Stark, 2003; Lindstrom and Mohseni, 2009).  
Social capital helps to produce the bulwarks of a strong society especially by how 
it produces the norms by which society functions, it is argued. These may be 
assessed for their standalone value, in that they promote widely accepted 
definitions of what is good and bad, what can be approved and allowed, and also 
how to sanction actions that are deemed wrong (Fukuyama 1999). Moreover, 
social capital produces strong social organizations that can help improve the 
overall efficiency of society, even when the nature of the organization seemingly 
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might not appear to have much importance to the grand concepts of democracy, 
equality, and national cohesion (Putnam 1993). 
Today, with the issue of democratic development in the Middle East 
continuing to attract almost daily attention, the question of how social capital 
works in the Arab world deserves greater focus. I examine now the pertinent 
variables currently encouraging or retarding the onset of wider political action in 
the Middle East, with a special interest in the role social capital plays, if any.  
Specifically, I examine data representing attitudes related to social capital and 
democratic action with an interest in the strength of their relationship and 
combined effect on political action. With this target, I aim for a succinct account 
of how closely related these factors are, with a particular interest in whether the 
association between social capital and political action remains strong when 
analyzed in the presence of other considerations. To be specific, I examine 
political action that is focused on collective, shared aims, for example joining a 
boycott or signing a petition. This is opposed to political action that is non-
democratic, for example authoritarian political action that might be aimed towards 
violence or oppression towards a specific group. This is how democratic action 
will relate to the political activity examined herein. In countries with healthy levels 
of democracy, there are ready-made indicators of democratic activity, such as 
voting rates or party registration. However, since there is a narrower range of 
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democratic activity to study within the Middle East region, I examine individual 
political activity that aligns with democratic intent. 
In the first section I summarize the genesis of social capital research and 
how it relates to current discussions of political action. There are two main fields 
of scholarship to review: social capital formation and the unique aspects of 
politics in the Middle East region. This also involves the introduction of political 
activity and democratic culture. When introducing literature on Middle East 
politics, I select studies that discuss specifically how the political culture both 
influences and is influenced by the concept of social capital.  
In discussing these topics, please note both the common precepts behind 
social capital studies and how it relates to political action, as well as the distinct 
characteristics of the regional setting examined herein. It will be noted that the 
literature on social capital has relevance to many disciplines and that there are a 
wide range of approaches to defining how relations between individuals informs 
aggregate political analysis. Although to date is no universal, unchallengeable 
definition and instrumentation of social capital in scholarly research, it is possible 
to draw conclusions on how to analyze it in the context of political action in the 
area.  
Next, in the data and methods section, the coding, hypothesis, and testing 
itself will be presented. This research employs a multinational study of political 
and social behavior, which presents the possibility of close comparison and 
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investigation. Following that, an analysis in the results section will cover the 
implications of the testing and address the importance in understanding how 
social capital functions in the Middle East with regards to political activity. It will 
be argued that the specific features behind the relationship will require focused 
analysis, as it reveals how the mechanism of democratization works in the 
region. In particular, the discussion of how best to research the relationship 





SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POLITICAL ACTION 
 The roots of scholarship on social capital and its effects can be found well 
into the past. As Farr (2004) points out, Karl Marx referenced the concept over 
one hundred years ago. He named the gesellshaftliche Kapital (individual 
capitals formed together for production) as an integral part of society. Since then, 
research into social capital has explored a variety of perspectives. Below, the 
rational, psychological, and network explanations are presented, as well as the 
part education plays in social capital formation. Then, in the next section of this 
research, literature specific to the Middle East region will be discussed. 
 Before commencing the literature review, a discussion of what social 
capital and trust mean in the context of this paper is appropriate, as there are 
already numerous and inconsistent ways to conceptualize the terms, as 
evidenced by the literature itself. It is possible to state broadly, though, that a 
review of the topic shows that the concept of trust and social capital obviously 
engages the concept of human relationships. This occurs at the most basic level 
between two people, but it also concerns social relations between groups of 
people as a whole. Whenever there is interaction, it is usually for a purpose, 
namely to achieve a single or perhaps joined set of identifiable goals. In this 
study, I will examine social capital in terms of how individuals—or collectives of 
individuals—extend trust with the aim of achieving predetermined goals. 
7 
 
 Second, discussion of how social trust is amassed and spent necessarily 
concerns an amount of abstraction. Trust cannot be monetized into a pocketable 
currency. When people decide to engage others out of trust, be it one-on-one or 
by participating in a civic association, they do not end up with a bottom-line 
accounting of losses and gains. They abstract when they figure the value of 
social capital, and in this research (as well as the wider literature) there is a need 
to figure in rough terms how social capital is expended at different times and 
different circumstances without being able to treat it is a specific, measurable 
commodity to the decimal. This of course involves relaxing the strict use of the 
word “capital” as it can’t be measured like a standard asset in the economic 
sense. Rather than being employed as a unit of account to be measured for 
growth or contraction over daily or monthly periods, like a financial instrument, it 
will be used to operationalize and measure the institutional, group, and network 
activity surrounding the establishment and exchange of trust and civic 
engagement. 
 Thirdly, this research focuses on social capital as a predictor in propensity 
for political action and proceeds with the assumption that there is a certain 
consistency and reliability behind the matter. In this study, political action is 
identified by selecting measurements from the data set that directly relate to 
actual activity. As the methods section discusses, the survey instrument used 
herein contains many questions relating to political activity, including voting, 
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boycotting, lobbying, and so on. However the operationalization here will be on 
political activity that aims to satisfy a need for collective goals. It must also be 
noted that there a number of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reasons for 
why, especially on an individual level, social capital can be important one day 
and meaningless the next with regards to unified political action. However, for the 
purposes of this study, the analysis proceeds by treating trust as steady and 
reliable, not purely ephemeral; that is, when and where it exists, it can be 
examined and discussed for a correlation with political action. For the purpose of 
empirical analysis, it must be accepted that it is reliable enough in the sense that 
it is not just a fleeting construct, to be held only momentarily and independent of 
any attitudes towards or instances of political engagement. 
 
Rational Choice Explanations 
 Exploring social capital and the mechanisms of trust has led many 
researchers to evaluate discussions of rational choice. The concepts of reason 
and explorations of game theory are a common thread throughout such 
discussions. This approach is beneficial to the exploration of social capital 
because it in effect presents an opportunity for theoretical experimentation. As 
the discussion to follow shows, the rational choice approach allows for the inquiry 
into trust and engagement to be distilled into a “game” that can have rules and 
replicable features. This is a powerful tool; it allows for close examination of 
9 
 
decision-making and choice, the how and exactly why behind behavior. What’s 
more, when this approach is incorporated, different aspects of how social capital 
may accumulate in different situations/environments can be more closely 
examined.  
As an example, Olsen (1965) notably illuminates how the concept of 
repeated interaction itself develops accountability with regards to trust. When 
people physically interact—as is often the case the smaller a group is—they 
essentially incentivize participation over time, and thus accountability. The 
reason for this has to do with the idea behind rational behavior itself. At its 
essence, this concept involves the idea that people will take predictable actions 
based on a normative, ideal strategy to achieve their aims. Collectively, when 
they encounter one another and begin applying their rational strategy, they will 
also operate on the presumption that others are rational. In other words, when 
they share information, or signal trust, or attempt to understand someone else’s 
goals, they are applying some level of confidence that is discrete and rule-
governed rather than purely natural and chaotic. 
Coleman (1990) provides a rigorous description of how the underlying 
processes of decision-making behind trust play out. He presents the choice 
behind taking the option to trust instead of reject as a constant, ever-present part 
of social interaction. There is always a trustor, who has to extend herself and 
decide the value to be won from placing trust in another. The calculation is based 
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on probability; if the expected net gain realized provides a better outcome than 
deciding not to extend trust, then the trustor would and should make the rational 
decision to extend trust. Social capital as expressed by trust is furthermore self-
enforcing and circular when viewed in this manner. A cumulative effect becomes 
apparent working both positively and negatively. On the positive side, the 
rewards gained by trusting and coming out ahead compound the utility of 
extending trust. On the negative, there is a possibility of a vicious circle occurring 
if trust breaks down; once the norms of reciprocity are replaced with a stagnant 
standard of disorder and dereliction, it is hard for a society to beat back feelings 
of isolation and mistrust (Coleman 1988). 
Another documentation of rational choice and trust by Möllering (2006) 
echoes the calculations implicit behind the decision to trust. The rationalist 
paradigm he describes encompasses the incentives and risks involved. Since 
trust is a bare "matter of reason" when all is reduced, Möllering states that the 
clearest indicators of trustworthiness have to be based off an understanding of 
rationality. There are credible promises that people make to each other, 
precommitments that lead to desired and expected pay-offs, and inferences that 
may seem altruistic and unrealistic but are not necessarily irrational (2006).  
In particular, reasoning when one can or cannot trust depends on a 
rational understanding of risk. More often than not, the need to trust arises during 
circumstances where there is evident danger to simply gambling on the 
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expectation that others will be reliable. Once the decision is made, though, trust 
can be extended to absolute strangers despite the risk involved, and in these 
instances the personal investment in monitoring and enforcing their compliance 
heavily informs the decision to trust (Levi, 1996). A helpful example to consider 
with regards to this investigation is the trustworthiness of a civic association. If a 
group exists to serve some positive, public goal—improving awareness of an 
overlooked social issue, say—and it does so consistently and transparently, then 
it may often attract more members, and attain greater relevance and importance. 
This is worthwhile in considering the efficacy of civic associations in the Middle 
East, as independent civic groups may not have the same level of public 
recognition, a point that might influence the depth of civic activity and consequent 
political action. 
The valuation of trust in the context of social capital involves not only the 
rationality behind trusting but considerations of will. There are stages along the 
way to measuring the will of the other party as well as self-testing on the part of 
the trustor. At each point, there are different processes and procedures at work, 
according to Doney, Cannon, and Mullen (1998), and at each stage, the will to 
trust is tested. They identify a calculative process first, in which one party judges 
whether the other is a cheater, and even if they are, whether they have the 
audacity to cheat and risk being caught. If not, then they can therefore be trusted, 
at least in one limited interaction. It is helpful to be able to predict the potential 
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strength of conviction, to further reinforce and justify to the trustor that they can 
confer trust justifiably. The will to act honestly is measured right up to the point 
where the trust is actually transferred. A rational evaluation of trust, in their 
analysis, involves the awareness that the capability and resolve to hold steadfast, 
to resist the urge to cheat, is always part of the picture. 
Rationalist perspectives on social capital and trust are also important in 
how they move the discussion away from cultural or ethno-centric perspectives 
on the matter into evaluations of its actual function. This is the heart of a rational 
choice approach to the basic question of where and how social capital is 
formulated. A purely cultural perspective implies that there is an underlying 
transmutation that occurs, and it happens by virtue of culture alone. Certainly, 
culture has a relationship to social capital networks (this discussion is expanded 
in the following section on that literature). In other words, rather than simply 
stating that some societies have it and others do not--as Fukuyama does when 
he pronounces that it is unnatural to expect non-democratic societies to develop 
social capital (2001)--building a thorough rationalist discussion of social capital 
out provides the opportunity to explore the actual mechanisms as they operate. 
However, some scholars stop short of such strong emphasis on this point, i.e. 
they do not believe that these mechanisms are running at such a constant and 
intense level at all. For example Rothstein (2000) questions just how possible it is 
for human beings to engage in such continuous, churning calculations over trust. 
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The cognitive and predictive capabilities are just to taxing, he notes. If the 
amount of information A has to acquire and analyze about B is really that 
complex, then it would be expected that trust would become a truly exceptional 
outcome, one to be expected very little of the time. Fragmented information has 
to be part of the decision-making tree, due to the high costs of constantly 
processing information every time you contract with others. So, trust can often be 
subsumed by shorthand calculations based on historical knowledge and belief in 




 So much of the inquiry into social capital depends on a thicket of issues 
concerning the psychological qualities behind the concept. The emotional 
elements must be considered alongside all the discussion of the cognitive, 
rational components. In short, just as with other research attempting to gain 
insight into the predispositions of a vast collection of individuals, how the concept 
can be interpreted uniquely by many different, real human beings matters 
strongly. This serves as a major sticking point for those who have a pronounced 
opposition to the value of social capital research. Newton, for one, argues that it 
is dangerous to assume uniformity when examining trust (1999).  
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There is an expansive body of literature that addresses this very matter by 
bringing in the relevance of individual psychology. Uslaner presents the issue 
with an analogy using chicken soup: while it is a common comfort and does "all 
kinds of good things" the way it actually works remains mysterious (2002).  
It might have more to do with hope, for one, rather than trust, i.e. the hope 
that things will just be all better in the future. So, for a certain category of 
individual, trust in others flows from a fount of personal well-being and 
happiness, rather than a calculation of rational choice. Supportiveness and 
optimism are forged together to produce the hope amongst some that they can 
influence their environment through sheer will alone (Uslaner 2002). Thus the 
idea of rational trust--measuring interactions, gauging reciprocity, focusing on the 
perils, rewards and costs--becomes patchy and incomplete when held against an 
overriding mantra that if you are good, things will just get better.  
Jones (1996) similarly emphasizes the affective nature of trust. She 
suggests that the attitude of optimism is integral to understanding trust. 
Furthermore, this optimism gives rise to beliefs that are highly resistant to bare 
evidence, i.e. it can be self-confirming (1996). Trust thus becomes hope in the 
goodwill of others. In addition, “projecting” in the form of a psychological 
mechanism can accompany this hope (Levi, 1996). Being optimistic and trusting, 
an individual can project this sentiment onto others. This heuristic replaces any 
15 
 
sort of calculation, and a trustworthy person comes to believe that it is likely, 
acceptable, and reasonable to assume that others are naturally the same way. 
Life experience also comes into play and can influence how trust is 
expressed in different stages of growth. Kocher and Sutter took a sample of 
differing cohorts from ages eight on through to retirement age in order to assess 
the development of trust (2007). They used an experimental design in which the 
participants were observed during staged interactions. In their conclusion, 
Kocher and Sutter point out that the results indicate a linear rise in trust from 
early childhood to adolescence. This climb continues and then peaks at around 
30 to 40, following which the observed measurement declines. By the time 
retirement age approaches, the curve has returned to just above what it was 
during the early stages of life. They observe that this can be attributed to shifts in 
altruistic preferences, attitudes towards risk, and changes in self-centeredness.  
Generally speaking, this is an agreeable observation from the results as 
discovered through their study and analysis. With respect to political action, this 
would indicate that social capital can matter more or less depending on the age 
of citizens, with the indication being that trust climbs as it reaches early 
adulthood. In terms of the Middle East, there is a key, relevant observation to 
make here, i.e. that the demographic makeup of the region can possibly inform 
observed levels of trust. The region has a fast-growing share of greater numbers 
of youths under the age of 30. In connection with the Arab Spring and future 
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events, the supposition to be made could be that those deeper, more substantive 
levels of trust due to the life experiences and attitudes of Arab youth may inform 
social capital and political action in the region. 
 
Network Explanations 
 Citizens choose to belong to a variety of networks, which are within both 
official state-sponsored institutions and loose civic collectives. Social capital can 
be viewed, then, as the cultivation and expenditure of trust within the context of 
networks. This can be observed in a wide array of regime types and different 
societies. Furthermore, interaction can occur across many levels and 
varieties of institutions and networks. There may be official arrangements that 
engender and demand trust in others. Alternatively, networks may be totally 
informal, and can produce different qualities and features in the manner citizens 
gather together and rely upon each other. As Farell (2005) summarizes, the 
formal networks which exist under official imprimatur have written rules that can 
be enforced by a higher power; however, informal networks—which are often 
more numerous—have more informal standards that are usually enforced by 
closer relationships between participants. These networks rely on such factors as 
reputation to hold trust together.  
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This is an important distinction. In a formal network, the rules are rules, 
recorded with specific expectations of how participants are supposed to act. If 
they do so in an unexpected or unallowable manner, then there are 
consequences laid out ahead of time. However, if there are deviations from the 
expectation of how participants will commit to each other—or break their 
commitment and trust—then formal networks can prove brittle. In the context of 
informal social networks, though, there is wider leeway for handling non-standard 
occurrences. Even though the rules are less precise, and there is less of a formal 
law-enforcing authority overseeing all the interaction, the informal networks are 
more adaptable (Farrel 2005). The insight that may be taken away from all this is 
that even though informal networks are not bound tightly by formal structure, they 
can still be relevant to the more formal conduct of politics, by virtue of how the 
adaptability and momentum for change that might arise from informal 
associations can influence political action. Delving deeper into the recent events 
of the Arab Spring, it may be observed that informal networks both helped 
citizens to experience the type of open interaction that may have spurred on the 
desire to take political action, and furthermore when the actual time came for 
protest, the response to government attempts at repression was more adaptable 
and perhaps considerably more honed due to the very flexibility that helped 
contribute to the movement’s momentum in the first place. 
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 Putnam (1995) explores informal networks in his work, particularly how the 
decline of informal civic arrangements have harmed the quality of American 
democracy, in his view. His “Bowling Alone” work drew a connection between the 
downturn of civic engagement by citizens as neighbors and members of and a 
how a resulting bluntness in the sharpness of the overall social arrangement 
seemed to arise. Putnam warns that the networks that produce and sustain 
healthy civic engagement—even if not expressly political in concept and 
purpose—are so essential that without them, democracy itself is unsustainable. 
Democracy needs those reserves of social cooperation in order to avoid a 
crumbling death. According to Putnam, these reserves are built up whenever and 
wherever people meet and cooperate in social networks, so it isn’t hard to 
maintain a healthy level of social capital. In his titular example—bowling teams—
there is after all nothing that directly relates a leisurely activity to the preservation 
of America’s constitutional democracy. However, it doesn’t matter why people 
meet and what they decide to do; with regards to social capital and its 
hypothesized relationship to political activity, what matters is that people interact, 
period (Rothstein and Stolle 2003). 
 Network explanations of social capital often lean towards an all-or-nothing 
view of social capital. Following Putnam, Rice and Ling (2002) put forth an 
analysis examining the links between democracy and social capital. Culture is an 
essential part of the explanation, in that it both helps to create social capital and 
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ensure that it does not wither between generations and over centuries of history. 
Since it bears so much of the explanatory load, Rice and Ling further point out 
that making the move to democracy with full and complete levels of social capital 
can be challenging; culture, in other words, is hard to move away from, and 
shedding the old for a new replacement isn’t s always simple. Socioeconomic 
modernization doesn’t expressly require the accumulation of social capital as a 
prerequisite, but it does enter the discussion, particularly with regards to 
considerations of how newer, broader networks of cooperation and interaction 
continue to emerge. 
It is important to note here also some cross-regional differences between 
how trust may be conceptualized within say American culture and the Middle 
East. The determinants of trust may be compared in an empirical and anecdotal 
sense. At the outset, perhaps the most obvious scale of comparison would be to 
consider how the two differ on the line of individualism versus collectivism. This 
dimension has frequently been employed in prior research studies. As Hofstede 
(1980) summarizes, the more individualistic type of culture is bound by a "loosely 
knit" web of ties, where self-reliance is the order of the day and all are concerned 
with their own lot and perhaps that of their family members. They do not have to 
swear allegiance to any larger group, and commonly there wouldn't be a great 
number to profess fealty towards in the first place. A collectivist society, on the 
other hand, is distinguishable by broader groups of individuals. Whether through 
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clans or extended kinship, people are expected to identify with and maintain 
loyalty towards who they consider their "own" people within the framework of a 
more sharply delineated society, one where there are clear differences between 
groups.  
When it comes to a discussion of how this difference in culture impacts 
trust, a further suggestion is to consider how trust may be formed in one form of 
society versus the other. In an individualistic culture, the lone actor will tend 
towards a thoroughly calculative evaluation of whom to trust and when. By 
comparison, a more collectivist culture may produce trust based more on 
judgment of signals and merits. In other words, the measure of a person 
becomes less a calculation based on their individual resume at the point of giving 
trust, but rather who they are, where they come from, what group/clan/tribe they 
identify with, and how all of those identities can be transferred as proof and 
justification for their respectability and trustworthiness (Done et al 1998). 
Bohnet et al studied this exact question by surveying citizens in different 
ares of the Middle East and staging two-person trust experiments (2010). 
Consistent with cultural expectations, they found that trust did hinge on 
expectations of what costs betrayal would bring. As opposed to American cultural 
expectations, where breach of trust has individual, often times monetary or legal 
impact, the respondents in the Middle East emphasized heavily betrayal as a 
much greater concern. In other words, the respondents in the Middle East were 
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more likely to judge whom to trust, and considered extending trustworthiness in 
light of what everyone would stand to lose. By contrast, the authors point out that 
people in the United States were willing to trust based with much less to go on, 
even in identical situations, as they were comfortable with the damages coming 
through ordinary legal or monetary remedies. 
 
Education, Social Capital, and Democratic Values 
 Besides the associations people voluntarily join and the workplaces they 
have to occupy for the greater part of their adult lives, people spend a lot of time 
in school. It would follow, then, that researchers have examined what part the 
educational environment plays in social capital formation and exposure to 
democratic ideals. 
 Brehm and Rahn (1997) in an empirical analysis of exogenous causes of 
civic participation find that level of education is the single strongest predictor for 
whether an individual joins social groups and has generalized interpersonal trust 
in others, above and beyond such factors as income, party identification, hours 
spent watching television, and whether or not an individual lives in an urban or 
rural environment. Regarding education, Brehm and Rahn examine subjects with 
zero years of education all the way up to twenty total. What occurs over these 
two decades of learning is an increase in such factors as tolerance and open-
mindedness, the researchers theorize. A person who is exposed to education 
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year in, year out will broaden their viewpoints and become less suspicious of 
people who are different (Brehm and Rahn, 1997). 
 There are other things occurring in the educational environment that both 
directly and indirectly affect social capital formation, according to Warwick 
(1998). He also identifies education as a causal factor in his analysis. He argues 
that, for one, the direct indoctrination of norms that comprises so much of 
education influences trust. Moreover, there are indirect processes of socialization 
that occur in the course of education, and these also impact the development of 
trust. 
 In the following sections, research addressing the specific context of this 
transition in the Middle East will be presented. The summary focuses on 
questions regarding the acceptance or rejection of democracy in the Middle East, 
specifically literature that evaluates political, social, and cultural variables 






SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THE MIDDLE EAST CONTEXT 
 Having organized an understanding of how social capital is discussed in 
the literature—as an attribute starting with individuals, with rational, cognitive, 
and psychological foundations, then impacting wider networks and societies—it 
is important to introduce literature on the Middle East context. This chapter will 
review the concepts identified in the literature that are most relevant to social 
capital formation in the area of concern. There are a variety of approaches to 
understanding Middle East politics in general; these can be tied to numerous 
historical, social, and religious discussions. However in this section, the literature 
selected for discussion will be those preexisting studies that best relate to the 
formation of social capital in the region. 
 
A Clash with Democracy? 
To some researchers, there is the basic question of whether the basic 
bulding blocks of social capital just aren’t present within the region. Norris and 
Ronald (2002) examine whether any quantitative evidence can be discovered in 
support of the “clash of civilization” thesis.  This theory regarding global relations 
was first published by noted researcher Samuel Huntington following the end of 
the Cold War.  His understanding of the calamitous events following the 
devolution of the superpower standoff focused on the likelihood that multiple 
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civilizations would soon align themselves against each other in the absence of 
the U.S.-Soviet divide.  Perhaps most famously, he predicted a clash between 
Islamic civilization and Western powers.  Huntington's work relies heavily on 
primal logic, though, and builds descriptions of the two civilizations that departs 
almost entirely from palpable, measurable features and latches on to the 
(supposed) irrefutable nature of Western and Arab identities.  The substance of 
disagreements between these two societies—one democratic and free, the other 
unquestionably stagnant—is thus explained by Huntington’s firm, insistent 
tautology that the disputants are diametrically opposite, in terms of their nature, 
and thus will naturally oppose each other. Norris and Inglehart (2002) establish 
the goal of understanding the differences between the allegedly unrepentant and 
undemocratic Middle Eastern world and the West by evaluating whether all these 
differences touted by Huntington (amongst others) are entirely political 
differences as opposed to social separations.  Norris and Inglehart (2002) do 
examine measurements of how public opinion in the Muslim and Western worlds 
compare when it comes to acceptance of authoritarian rulers and preferences for 
democracy as a form of government.  But, they also monitor levels of social 
opinion.  Specifically, they examine differences of opinion on issues such as 
sexual freedom and gender equality.  They find that Western and Arab countries 
track closely when it comes to their opinions on democracy—quite closely, in 
fact, in their preferences for democratic rule—but then depart when it comes to 
matters of social orientation (Norris and Inglehart, 2002).   
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Moreover, these separate viewpoints are in fact more strongly expressed 
within the Arab and Muslim world than between it and the outside West, i.e. it is 
more often an issue of the younger generations of Arabs and Muslims diverging 
from their elders when it comes to social issues.  It is this cultural cleavage, the 
two authors argue, and not an issue concerning an alien Middle East facing down 
the West, that best characterizes the supposed Islamic rejection of democracy.  
They argue against the hypothesis that the undemocratic Muslim part of the 
globe will naturally conflict with the democratic West; instead, they conclude that 
democracy is in fact endorsed by a clear majority of the region, and that 
irreconcilable differences over social matters deserve greater attention over all-
out fears of political divide (Norris and Inglehart 2002). This is important to the 
discussion of social capital formation, specifically the concept that is culturally 
present or not present, simply.   
 
The Religious Context 
In a study of differences between Arab and Muslim countries, Stepan and 
Robertson (2003) construct a model to evaluate the democratic performance of 
the two groups over the last three decades.  They begin with the observation that 
Muslim-majority yet non-Arab countries have achieved different levels of 
democratic achievement then their fellow Arab-majority countries, even though 
all of these countries share the same Islamic faith.  Next, they define electoral 
26 
 
competitiveness as the target measure of democratic achievement, and they 
rightly noted that holding elections doesn’t necessarily mean that a country 
should be considered entirely free and democratic.  Still, they write, “electoral 
competitiveness is always a necessary condition for democracy, and thus always 
a central factor to consider when evaluating prospects for future 
democratization.” (2003)  
Stepan and Robertson use two data sources for their study.  Their results 
are—as they themselves put it—“striking.” Out of the 29 non-Arab but Muslim 
nations, nearly half showed significant levels of democratic achievement.  Out of 
the Arab nations, only one, Lebanon, experienced a measurable level of 
democratic performance.  From this, Stepan and Robertson concluded that 
holding Islam solely responsible as the explanatory factor for low levels of 
democracy in the Arab world is, for all purposes, scientifically misleading.  Their 
findings were met with rejection by some scholars, who questioned how they 
could defensibly separate out subsets of non-Arab majority from Islamic nations 
and Arab-majority countries from the Islamic population so cleanly (Lakoff 2004).  
This rejection is built around the dispute over what really qualifies as an Arab 
country that is non-Muslim or a Muslim country that is non-Arab, especially in 
terms of rating democratic vitality. For example, the selection of Comoros as a 
Muslim but not Arab democracy is questionable, as it is only a small fraction of 
the global Muslim community. Even choosing Malaysia, which is the world’s 
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largest Muslim state, and terming it a democracy as Stepan and Robertson do 
can be considered a tenuous coding. Even though there are elections in 
Malaysia, there is still a strong authoritarian element to the national government, 
so much so that it may be best termed a transitioning democratic nation. 
Still, as far as particularities important to further study of the issue of 
Middle East democracy, the authors do highlight that isolating the other factors 
unique to the region—outsized levels of defense spending and the effect of their 
intractable conflict with Israel, among other issues—would better explain the 
matter, and not a blanket view that religion is the sole explanatory variable.  The 
further take-away is that there is no reason to believe that such issues should be 
considered absolutely irresolvable.  Despite immediate issues surrounding the 
seemingly intractable question of why free societies have yet to take root in the 
Middle East, the supposition they somehow never will, and that instead there 
should only be acceptance for further decades of democratic blight is wrong-
headed, they conclude (Stepan and Robertson 2003). 
With this general matter of religion brought into consideration, the more 
exact question of where and how social capital makes an impact can be 
considered. The religious makeup of the Middle East can be examined for 
influence on the question of social capital formation, as it would regardless of 
what specific religion or region is under examination. In examining social capital 
and civic/political engagement, the connection to religious participation has 
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already come under consideration (Smidt 1999, Tolbert et al. 1998). The 
conclusions thus far indicate that the community building nature of religious 
activity do overlap with the very same considerations of mobilization, information 
sharing, and calls to action that social capital theory address. The bonds aren’t 
so exact as to say that trust is begat of religion and thus religion breeds 
automatic trust. However the connection between worship and engagement with 
a religious community is worth remembering with regards to how it might lead to 
eventual political action (Wilson and Janoski 1995). It may promote activity, but 
there is also the matter of the possible fractious nature of religious behavior, i.e. 
the in-group versus out-group impact of religious observance (Altmeyer 2003). 
This is quite obviously a constant consideration when approaching what may 
seem like outwardly homogenous countries in the Middle East. One need only 
mention the phrase “Sunni vs. Shia” to prompt considerations of how religious 
ethnocentrism can preempt any discussion of social capital contributing to 
political action.  
To expand, assuming that levels of religiosity in the Middle East region 
leads automatically to a platform for increased social capital is not well-advised, 
at least as far as support in the literature. For example, Putnam (1993) 
addresses this question of religiosity in studying Catholicism in Italy. He finds that 
church attendance actually contributes to less civic engagement. When time 
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spent worshipping goes up, associationalism goes down. Putnam explains it as 
follows: 
Organized religion, at least in Catholic Italy, is an alternative to the civic 
community, not a part of it. Church-goers ... seem more concerned about 
the city of God than the city of man. (Putnam 1993, pp. 107--109). 
 
Internal Conflict and Oil Wealth 
Sørli, Gleditsch, and Strand (2002) focus on internal conflict for their 
investigation of Middle East politics.  They ask the specific question of why the 
Middle East is one of the most conflict-prone regions in today’s world.  Building 
on a previous study constructed by Collier and Hoeffler covering economic 
sources of conflict in Africa, the authors investigate why the Arab world is 
characterized by weak political institutions and strong amounts of tension.  They 
refine an important perception concerning why there is so much civil disruption in 
the region.  First, there are high levels of grievances over the state of affairs in 
Middle East countries.  Citizens are beset with very real problems in their polities, 
particularly issues over economic inequality, political disenfranchisement, ethnic 
conflict, and spiritual polarization.  In the midst of all this exists the central 
concern over natural resource dependence, specifically the influence of oil on the 
political and economic systems of Middle East nations.  Although the region 
differs from Africa in that there aren’t (yet) rebel groups engaged in armed strife 
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and “loot-seeking” over oil resources, the region is characterized by heavy 
amounts of “rent-seeking” throughout. Middle East regimes have become quite 
adept at holding off calls for economic and political reform.  They’ve achieved 
expert proficiency in using the “carrot and stick” of oil revenue to keep their 
citizens pacified.  Sørli, Gleditsch, and Strand conclude that without improved 
management of natural resources, as well as improvement in the political 
institutions that have so far developed entirely around oil spigots, the Middle East 
will not now or in the immediate future see a sudden flowering of transparent, 
legitimate democracies (2002).   
This key factor of oil wealth is often referenced in discussions over political 
transformation, especially in the Middle East. Three separate causal mechanisms 
act in combination inside entire states. The first effect is the aptly-named rentier 
effect. This takes effect through the government’s use of fiscal power to negate 
the public’s attempts to express political will. When the public demands 
amendments to the how the government rules—in the few cases where there 
may even be a published constitution to begin with—the authorities can literally 
outspend the public and pacify the outspoken amongst them, overpowering the 
effects of broad social capital. Through patronage, authorities can buy off political 
opponents while also purchasing outright the support of more complicit, pliable 
elements of the public. This can have a possible dilatory effect on social capital, 
as trust is replaced by expectations and reliance on outright bribery. 
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Governments in the Middle East have enormous resources when it comes to 
budgeting efforts to secure patronage (Ross 2001). They can also point out to 
the public that since they don’t collect any taxes (as is often the case in oil-
wealthy states) there is no reason for the citizenry to complain in the first place 
about how the government rules. This is a key element of the entire effect; 
policies that trim the reliable, unchecked sources of wealth for governments and 
force them to tax and spend wisely will in turn boost calls for transparency and 
openness (Ross 2004). Running through all of this, also, is the consideration 
over who might pressure the government in the first place, i.e. whether or not the 
public can actually exert combined pressure on the ruling authorities.  The entire 
effect knocks the legs out from underneath public opposition before it can even 
form through the precise use of government largesse. Authorities can squeeze 
out attempts for group formation anywhere in between the level of the state and 
individual, leaving only the family or tribe as the sole units of social cohesion 
(Ross 2001). Even when it comes to official government branches, like the 
legislature, ruling regimes can decide to appoint members rather than hold open 
elections; this is an extreme case of patronage at work, if nothing else.   
This leads to the importance of the repression effect, wherein resource 
wealth in rentier states is used for the all-out extermination of political 
disobedience.  Such harsh measures as secret investigations and official torture 
are alive and well in many Arab and Islamic countries (they seem to be on the 
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comeback trail here as well, but that’s another matter). Moreover, the nature of 
how oil is extracted and delivered leads to despotism, scholars argue. By way of 
explanation, consider that natural resources such as oil don’t flow as easily as 
some may metaphorically wish; rather, in the course of extracting and securing 
oil, states have to work strenuously to suppress (or sometimes even promote) 
ethnic, communal, or sectarian tensions.  They also have to guard their natural 
bounty against greedy neighbors, who might be inclined to invade and occupy 
their precious oil fields.  In light of this, it’s no stretch to understand why oil-
wealthy nations spend heavily on both their internal and external security 
apparatuses (Ross, 2001). 
Thirdly, rentier states exhibit strenuous resistance to the democratization 
effects that other transitioning states may enjoy, at least partially.  Scholars have 
outlined the direction and impact of social and cultural changes on the adoption 
of democracy.  Economic wealth plays a key part in this process, in that it is 
through the wider work of market mechanisms that individuals and groups grow 
beyond restrictive state systems, thus demanding representation and freedom. It 
is important to stress here that this is a social process, not a purely political one.  
If there was a direct line of causation between economic wealth and democracy, 
then rich states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would have become rapturous 
democratic havens. But they are not, because of the hypothesized effect of oil 
wealth as an active constraint on democratization. As discussed above, the 
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inhibiting effects override any contribution to broad development of social capital. 
Rather than helping match trust and civic engagement to political activity, oil 
wealth may have a disruptive effect (Ross 2001). In particular, the manner in 
which the rentier system shifts the emphasis between deep trust and reciprocity 
by repeated interactions to tight bonds of communication and reward between 
the privileged few is essential to the query of whether wide reserves of social 
capital can impact political action in the Middle East. 
 
Gender and Social Capital 
 In assessing the literature on social capital, the matter of gender 
difference appears often, both as a subject of experiments comparing female and 
male behaviour in game-theory types of situations as well as a point of interest 
when discussing broad differences between how men and women engage in 
voluntary associations. Below, I address literature on trust formation and then 
civic engagement in associations where gender differences come into focus. 
 Innocenty and Pazienza (2006) looked for variation in results of an 
experimental game played by a group of men and then women. Their study 
examined whether women trusted to give more and expect less than men, and 
they did, as it turned out. As the authors explain, differences in attitudes towards 
risk and observable disparity in altruism between the two test groups indicated 
that, at least in the context of a turn-based psychological experiment, men and 
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women behave differently. Similarly, Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2002) found 
that expectations of reciprocity, specifically, differ between the two genders. In 
keeping with the formulation that trust is built largely on expectations of return, 
they experimented with subjects playing an investment game. Men and women 
differed when it came to how much they trusted to give and how much they 
expected in return.  
Other scholars have conducted different types of experimentation, and 
there does remain controversy on whether a final answer could be given to 
whether one gender trusts more than the other, crucially. Bonein and Serra 
(2006) raise the point that it all has to do with “sex solidarity” between the 
genders, ultimately.  It suffices to say that there are differences. This debate in 
the literature is not entirely integral to the research question in this paper, though. 
The concern is less over whether women will only trust women, or men only men, 
but rather whether generalized trust in combination with civic associationalism 
can lead to political activity.  
A more relevant aspect of gender differentiation is how men and women 
engage their social surroundings differently when it comes to volunteering in 
associations. Going back through the decades, studies of population samples 
have repeatedly shown a difference in amount of civic engagement, type, and 
frequency between genders. For example, Scott (1957) found that the descriptive 
statistics showed a pronounced gap. Of all men, twenty percent more were part 
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of a voluntary group when compared to women (the difference was 75-56). Men 
have a higher number of average civic memberships, volunteering for an average 
of two groups at the time, whereas women only were members of one and a half 
groups on average. Furthermore, men made greater appearances at group 
meetings and events month to month. Women and men also differed in the 
variety of group; men engaged in fraternal and professional organizations (often 
ones open to only them) such as unions and professional groups, and women as 
a group committed themselves most to religious organizations. 
Moving forward a decade and a half later, the situation appeared mostly 
the same. Men and women differed in the types of groups they chose to 
associate with (or were allowed to associate with, one must consider). Men had 
opportunities to join organizations to their field, and did so in higher numbers. 
Women belonged to different types of civic associations, and interestingly had 
more long-term memberships in organizations (Babchuck and Booth, 1969). 
The disparities seem to have held up all the way through to today. Lin 
(2000) finds that when the type of association is scrutinized, there are marked 
differences between male and female engagement. Males have access to and 
enjoy membership in organizations that are different in terms of size and 
influence. Lin points out that this likely has much to do with homogeneity of these 
associations, i.e. men will have membership in associations with lots of men, and 
furthermore if there is a hierarchy to be climbed within the association, men can 
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more readily move up. For women, there is an observed difference. The types of 
voluntary groups are comparatively weaker and less influential, in other words 
disadvantaged by comparison. Interestingly, the relevance of child-rearing does 
appear in the comparison, and it is different by gender. The fact that a man has a 
child seemingly did not have an impact on propensity to engage in voluntary 
membership in associations, but for women, there was a negative effect when 
child-rearing became a part of their lives. It appears that traditional gender roles 
can translate to engagement with voluntary associations. Where the assigned 
task of child-rearing falls to women, a society may have imbalanced levels of 
civic engagement. This is highly relevant to discussions of social capital, as the 
concept of trust and civic engagement are theorized to work in tandem, 
reinforcing each other. Ironically, when women and men do not work in tandem 
on the task of childrearing, it appears that the accumulation of social capital 
decreases.  
  
Popular Support for Reform: Information and Motivation 
 Previous research also speaks to the specific issue of whether Muslim and 
Arab populations truly desire a change in their collective lot. Reporting on his 
analysis of public opinion polls in the Middle East, Tessler (2005) finds that 
although the region is known for high levels of conflict and authoritarianism, it is 
should also be recognized for high levels of support for democracy, both in 
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absolute, raw affection for democracy amongst citizens of the Middle East and 
also their desire relative to the rest of the world. He operationalizes and 
measures this by employing individual survey data taken in four Middle Eastern 
countries. To assess support for democracies, he uses a summary of questions 
that relate to rating democracy as a political systems above or below other 
possible forms. One question asks outright for the respondent’s support for 
democracy, asking them to state whether it is a good or bad way run a country. 
He also includes survey questions that ask for ratings of whether a “strong leader 
who does not bother with elections” is appropriate, as well as if “having the army 
rule the country” is appropriate. In addition, he asks respondents if they agree 
that “democracies are good at maintaining order” and also for their direct opinion 
on whether they are “better than any other form of government” (Tessler 2005, 
85). The useful part of this approach to measuring support for democracy is that 
it takes recognized characteristics—such as a government formed by election, 
and independent rule by civilians, rather than the army—and directs the question 
towards actual sentiment. This better establishes the real, practical 
understanding of what it means to support democracy as an actual desire, rather 
than a remote concept. 
Tessler finds pronounced Arab support for democratization. Still, as 
Tessler himself points out, the matter is not so open and shut. There is still the 
question of whether people in the region really do visualize democracy in the 
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Middle same way we might conceptualize it. In other words, democracy in an 
Islamic light may be closer to what Arab respondents may in fact envision.  In his 
analysis, Tessler finds that there is in fact a division between whether or not 
people support secular democracy per se or if they favor Islamic democracy; the 
division is roughly equal. Despite a difference of opinion over the role Islamic 
faith should play in the Middle East, support for democracy far outstrips 
preference for authoritarianism. 
 This point is relevant to a discussion of social capital as it rounds back to 
the matter of its basic worth and value in a democracy (or a democratizing 
region). This essentially pushes back against the supposition that social capital is 
purely a product of regional culture, and that it can’t be measured or studied in 
any worthwhile because it can never said to exist at all, for civilizational relations. 
Specifically, the rational choice and network arguments indicate that where there 
is a possibility of support for democratic engagement, social capital can fortify 
two essential elements of the equation: motivation and information.  
 It has long been established that political information as a measurable, 
identifiable commodity can be found in certain expected places. Some are 
obvious—newspapers, television news media, radio, official ministries, and so 
on. Yet even the seemingly most apolitical and innocuous of interactions can be 
considered part of the process of political engagement. A casual remark between 
coworkers, a discussion about a campaign button someone may be wearing, an 
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article shared between students, all of these scenarios reinforce the argument 
that political information appears when individuals interact with each other within 
some social structure (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987). It is more the sum of the 
whole that becomes relevant to a discussion of how individuals learn and 
express their political opinions. Even if not every last social interaction can be 
classified as politically relevant, when considered cumulatively, the information 
that emerges from the “social matrix”—especially if it comes through membership 
in an organization—should be included in discussions of political behavior (Eulau 
1986).   
 The quantity of associational engagement and robustness of the emerging 
social ties has been shown to influence political behavior aimed at reform. Early 
in America’s history, de Tocqueville identified the presence and popularity of 
open social organizations in the newly-established nation. He opined that 
Americans were beginning to express greater feelings of duty and commitment to 
their democracy with their increased social participation, particularly due to the 
regular civic exercises (1990). 
Later in history, MacAdam and Paulsen (1993) examined whether 
membership in civic organizations influenced commitment to high-stakes political 
protests (in their study’s case, the decision to join civil rights protests in 1964 
Mississippi). They assessed activism within the context of civic associationalism, 
i.e. whether the later was salient to the decision to engage in political action. The 
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conclusion was that exposure to political issues, and the awareness and 
consumption of information, was relatable to individual engagement in a social 
group, even if it wasn’t a strictly political organization. It may have been religious, 
civic, or educational, but the effects on political action could be assessed in a 
similar fashion. 
Above and beyond the exposure to information, there is the matter of how 
intellectual assessment of political issues can be expanded by social 
engagement. Again, even if individuals take active membership in an 
organization that isn’t an absolute political group dealing exclusively with purely 
political discourse, sometimes discussions over politics might arise. This leads to 
debate and exposure to differing opinions. When this occurs, regardless if it 
leads to greater interest or commitment to a given political topic, the simple 
increase in awareness is relevant to future action (Mutz 2002). Thus, the 
intellectual flexibility acquired through civic activity is relevant to a discussion of 
democratization, as it connects to why individuals might come to understand the 
importance of free political expression in the first place.  
Furthermore, the matter of trust in the source of information bears 
relevance. If the access to alternate sources of information is considered just by 
itself, without venturing into the topics of salience, strength, influence, and so on, 
then that alone bears relevance to the inquiry.  Overall trust in information, then, 
bears importance to the discussion of how social capital relates to motivation. If 
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citizens do take on the challenge of political action, then there arises an entry 
point into the assessment of social capital and democratization, i.e. how both 
their collective and individual trust and confidence is tied to social capital. Put 
another way, trust in others borne out of the creation and utilization of social 
capital will impact motivation. John and Klein noted this in their study of boycotts, 
where the entire underlying reason for even attempting a boycott rests explicitly 
on the idea that others will actually act for the perceived common good of all 
(2003). There is a also a cycling component, similar to the individual, repeated 
cycles of trust-formation in terms of individuals (discussed above) that is relevant 
to the collective level as well. Uphoff (2000) theorizes that social capital becomes 
in a way an investment that can pay out greater dividends as more and more 
citizens build relationships and trust through repeated interactions. This social 
investment itself brings returns of more formidable levels of motivation and trust 
in such a manner that the social well-being of all becomes realized at 






DATA AND METHODS 
 Having reviewed the literature on social capital formation and the general 
state of politics in the Middle East region, I can proceed beyond defining 
concepts to identifying and operationalizing relevant data for analysis.  As 
advised in previous studies, the variables used in this research will be employed 
as part of a “most different systems” approach (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). I 
will use as broad a sample as possible, but look for causal patterns originating at 
the individual level. Building upon the lowest unit of analysis, I will inspect for 
individual-level activity to see how that influences the assessment. So, I employ 
surveys of individual viewpoints through the Middle East region and will further 




 I utilize a popular, long-established, and publicly-available database for 
both the dependent and independent sections of the analysis. The World Values 
Survey is part of a global initiative focused on recording how different people 
view selected social, cultural, and political issues. It is cross-disciplinary in that it 
addresses issues relevant to multiple academic fields and has a considerably 
large sample size. The survey instrument—which is carried out in multiple 
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“waves” every five years—is designed so that the same concepts can be 
operationalized in a variety of different languages and regions. The surveys are 
carried out locally by trained, professional social scientists in collaboration with a 
world-wide network of researchers. A single advisory board creates the initial 
survey, which is then tailored to all eighty countries included in the WVS. Once 
collected, all data is posted freely on the Internet. The WVS affords the 
opportunity to include individualized as well as aggregated data in studies of 
political and social temperament. With regards to social capital and political 
action, even though the questions as designed are not necessarily pure 
considerations of social capital and specific activity as far as date, time, and 
place, they are many choices that can be assembled into reliable proxy 
indicators.   
 Petitions, boycotts, and lawful demonstrations are the three dependent 
variables pulled from the WVS for this inquiry. They are chosen because they 
specifically measure propensity and desire to take democratic action. Crucially, 
this measurement must focus on actual will, as the overall aim of this research is 
to see whether generalized trust and civic engagement will translate into actual 
political activity. The variables used come from the response to this question: 
I’m going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, 
and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done 
any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never, under any 




 The response range for these questions is set up in the WVS so that each 
corresponds to a numeric value. A value of zero is the lowest willingness to take 
democratic action, i.e. “would never do” any of the three activities. A value of 
three denotes the highest propensity to take political action, in other words, a 
respondent has exhibited the most desire or actual activity with regards to 
political action. I sum the responses together so that there is a maximum score 
given to those who have done all three.1  
 
Independent Variables 
 I focus on putting the concept of social capital into measurable form by 
selecting two independent variables related to features of trust and civic 
engagement. I also include education, as it has relevance to political action. 
 In the literature, the idea of defining and measuring social capital has been 
reviewed and discussed extensively. I follow the approach put forth by Putnam 
(1993, 1995), who emphasizes two adjoining concepts underpinning social 
capital: civic associationalism and trust. The two components emerge from the 
treatment and definition of social capital as the elements that feature most often 
                                            
1
 See Appendix A for frequencies on all variables 
2 The “free” countries are Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of 
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Northern 
Ireland, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. 
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when we think of social life—that is, the cultural precepts and networks that 
together encourage and engender association and cooperation amongst people 
bonded in some way by local community and wider nationhood.  
 The WVS includes an extensive panel of questions dealing with aspects of 
civil life and trust. I take two that engage directly with the matters of civic 
participation and generalized trust in others. One question reads: 
In general would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can 
never be too careful when dealing with people? 1) Most people can be 
trusted 2) Can’t be too careful/Have to be careful 
The cognitive and behavioral aspects behind why people trust and 
whether they will extend this trust to taking democratic action does raise relevant 
considerations of how a survey can fully encompass individual perceptions for 
wider comparison. Social capital as expressed in the levels of trust involves the 
examination of a multi-faceted notion, one that can be distilled in a variety of 
different ways even when the respondents are from the same region, nation, or 
household, for that matter. Still, as Hardin (2006) points out, there is utility in 
asking the same question about trust, for comparative purposes, especially if the 
question does not include the suggestion of theorizing what trust constitutes one 
or way another. Appropriately, the question used in the WVS leaves the 
theorizing about circumstances, risks, and utility of trust itself to the respondent. 
This allows for the possibility of broader analysis. Furthermore, it is helpful that 
this survey question touches on concepts of generalized trust, by including that 
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necessary, elemental key word. As discussed in the literature review, generalized 
trust occupies a slightly separate space that other forms of trust. As Ulsaner 
(2002) points out, trust can be thought of in exclusively moralistic terms. People 
may decide to trust others out of moralistic duty, in other words. However, for 
purposes of this investigation, generalized trust must be operationalized. This is 
trust in others that is not based on concrete ties in concrete contexts, built on an 
unshakeable moral base. Rather, it is trust of the type that people share with 
strangers, and it is given at a level beyond the belief that it is simply benevolent 
and good to do so. 
The question touching on civic participation is presented to the subjects of 
the study as follows: 
Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each one, 
could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member, 
or not a member of that type of organization? 
There are eight responses given as possible choices, including an “other” 
category. These include local community organizations, women’s-oriented 
groups, general recreational groups, specific sporting associations, professional 
organizations, youth groups, and social welfare groups. A higher count of 
memberships (between inactive and active both) will be assembled to give a 
score of civic participation. This spotlight on how participation—also referred to 
as civic associationalism—can influence the propensity to take political action is 
one of the more widely-recognized themes in social capital research. Paxton 
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(2002) views the interdependent relationship between civic associationalism and 
democracy as an important feature of established democracies. Participation and 
civic engagement affords the opportunity for citizens to explore associational life 
as volunteer participants, and all the attendant experiences that go along with 
such activity serve as a sort of test-bed for political action. Groups of people 
participating working on issues of interest with each other, especially in the 
context of associations dealing with issues they view as germane to their quality 
of life, engages discourse and mobilization that becomes a critical part of 
democratization (Paxton, 2002). So, I choose every variety of association 
covered in the World Values Survey, to see if membership correlates with the 
motivation and will to take political action.  
There is an important debate regarding whether social capital—both in 
terms of network trust and civic associationalism—is really just a function of 
education. Democratic action, in other words, does not occur thanks to social 
capital but rather education, since that is what produces the atmosphere for 
enlightened civic engagement. So, I include a WVS survey response regarding 
education, in order to ascertain the part it plays. Specifically, I choose the 
measure of education attained. This starts with none at the low end and rises 
through ordinal responses until reaching full completion of a university diploma at 






 My hypotheses are arranged around the research question of how social 
capital impacts democratic action in the Middle East.  I wish to establish the 
direction and strength of social capital in terms of trust and civic associationalism.  
Where there is data on individual engagement in group activities as well as trust 
in others, the aim is to establish whether proclivity towards political action 
changes. I employ statistical analysis using Spearman's rho to provide a 
measure of correlation between the independant and dependant ordinal-level 
variables in this study. The coding of results in this research is done by 
categories, essentially, and they are ranked from most to least. Using this 
measurement of association, the resulting tables will show whether a positive or 
negative relationship exists, i.e. whether a rise in one will produce a decrease in 
the other, or an increase in correlation. It can be applied to this sample 
accurately since it does not have stringent requirements for minimum size or 
specific equal grouping of results. When the results are reviewed in the coming 
section, the expectation will be that a perfect 1.00 shows perfect agreement, a -







Hypotheses One:  This is the influence of generalized trust on democratic 
action. The more trust a respondent has, the more likely they will be to 
take political action. 
Hypothesis Two:  The second hypothesis assesses the influence civic 
associationalism has on democratic action. A greater amount of civic 
activity will have a positive effect on political action. 
Hypothesis Three:  This hypothesis brings in education, namely the 
possibility that education does a better job of explaining democratic action 
rather than civic associationalism or generalized trust. 
I also include a comparison between two models, one for the three 
countries selected from the Middle East and another using established 
democracies. This regression model looks at civic associationalism and trust as 
predictors of democratic action. For the collection of democratic countries, I rely 
on the ratings published under Freedom House, an independent organization, to 
select 412 countries rated “free” in 2010. For the model covering the Middle East, 
                                            
2 The “free” countries are Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of 
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Northern 
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I use the three countries covered in the World Values Survey. All are 
authoritarian governments that fall under the “not free” category in the Freedom 
House ratings. They are further characterized by low levels of political openness. 
Although Egypt and Jordan in particular have active elections, as a group, 
according to Freedom House, none of them are countries in which the citizenry 
can democratically choose which party or leader they want in power. So, by 
comparing the two models, I can test the conjecture that trust and civic 
associationalism have different impacts in the Middle Eastern authoritarian states 
than in established democracies. 
  
                                                                                                                                  
Ireland, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, 




 This assessment is an investigation of how social capital relates to political 
action in the Middle East region. In the first section to follow, the crosstabulation 
for each independent variable against the political action variable is presented, 
with the aim of understanding where, if any, the concentration of responses may 
be. Next, the correlation between the variables will be analyzed, in order to see 
the how the measurements from the WVS can be tied together, if at all. From this 
analysis, it will be possible to determine the significance of these concepts with 
regards to the region. A discussion of the results and overall conclusions to be 
made follows in the next chapters.  
 
Crosstabs 
The general distribution of the survey responses is shown in the following 
tables. Each is a cross tabulation showing percentage and count at each level of 
response, with a column showing combined values for all three countries. By 
examining each crosstab, the dispersion of survey responses can clearly be 
seen. 
In Table 1, the count for the civic associationalism survey question is 
shown by country as well as the region. Recall from the previous section that this 
part of the survey asks respondents to give a count of their group membership. 
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The greater number of professional, civic, health, educational, and other groups 
the respondent volunteers with, the higher his or her count will be when this 
variable is computed. I sum them together, with the lowest possible score being a 
zero (in other words, no civic associationalism to be found) and the highest being 
sixteen. Also, note that inactive membership is also examined, so the highest 
response means active participation in every variety of civic group, not just past 
membership. In examining the crosstab, it appears that overall membership in 
voluntary organizations is quite low. In each country, the great majority of 
responses combine together in the no participation area of the table. There are 
respondents who do engage in at least one civic association, and have active 
membership. This is a much smaller population, but still, it is present and they 
are accounted for in this wave of the World Vales survey, as shown in the table. 
In Table 2, the cross tabulation between trust and country is shown, along 
with the total for the region again. The survey question chosen essentially 
becomes a yes or no answer. If the respondent answers that most people can be 
trusted, then they are indicating that they exhibit trust. If they respond instead 






Table 1: Crosstab of Civic Associationalism by Country/Region 

























































































































































 Table 2 shows that generalized trust is not a widely held concept in the 
region. Country by country, the greater share of those surveyed indicated that 
they would not be too careful in trusting others. Jordan is the most trusting, 
where almost a third of those surveyed said that most people can be trusted. 
Still, this seems to indicate that generalized trust is not a widespread resource in 
the region. Again, the next section of the research will discuss correlation 
between those who do trust others and their political action—that is, how one 
variable may predict the other—but for now, it appears that there are low levels 
of trust, overall. The combined total is eighty percent say that one can’t be too 
careful, and twenty percent exhibit generalized trust, as operationalized in this 
survey question. 
Table 2: Crosstab of Trust by Country/Region 
 Jordan Morocco  Egypt Combined 
 
Most people 






















The crosstab shown in Table 3 covers the amounts of political activity as 
measured by the WVS. As discussed previously, this question is used as a 
measurement of propensity to take political action that would be best considered 
democratic nature, i.e. not violent, and with the aim of achieving a shared, 
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collective goal. The distribution throughout the table, as with the previous cross 
tabs, shows that there is great concentration in one area, but there are still 
responses and counts in different cells. On the whole political action is low, as 
measured by this operationalization of the concept. 
 
Table 3: Crosstab of Political Action by Country/Region 

















































































Correlations and Regression Model 
The correlations between the variables dealing with generalized trust, civic 
associationalism, and education are presented in Table 4 through Table 6. 
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The results in Table 4 show that the statistical significance does not meet 
an appropriate level for all three countries when considering trust and democratic 
action. This does not support the hypothesized expectation presented above. 
Without significance to at least the .05 level, the correlation between the two 
variables is not reliable. Furthermore, the coefficient’s low values in the case of 
each country—as well as the combined sum--leads to the conclusion that there 
are low amounts of correlation. 
 





Correlation coefficient (ρ) 
Egypt (n=2,930) -.027 
Jordan (n=1,133) -.011 
Morocco (n=837) .008 
Combined (n=4,900) -.017 
 
 
In Table 5 Jordan, Morocco, and the combined sample show significance 
to the .01 level when evaluating the correlation between membership in civic 
organizations and propensity to take democratic action. The value for Egypt does 
not have statistical significance. The highest coefficient comes in Morocco, with a 
value of .346 there. There is correlation, then, between respondents who are 
members of voluntary, civic-oriented organizations and taking democratic action 
as defined by participating in boycotts, petitions, and public protests. Still, though, 
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the overall value of coefficients are not in keeping with the hypothesized 
expectations. In short, even though it appears that respondents do have 
generalized trust in others, that trust is not doing much by way of its correlation 
with democratic action. 
 






Correlation coefficient (ρ) 
Egypt (n=2,936) -.029 
Jordan (n=1,139) .117** 
Morocco (n=849) .346** 
Combined (n=4,924) .102** 
 
Notes: 
*-Significant at the .05 level 
**-Significant at the .01 level 
 
  
Table 6 shows the correlation between political action and level of 
education. Again Morocco shows the highest value and the coefficient does have 
significance to an acceptable level. Overall, though, the correlation coefficient for 
the combined total of all countries at .017 is low. Taken alongside the results 
from the first two tests, this indicates that the hypothesized relationships shown 
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in these three tables are not showing through clearly, i.e. there is weakness in 
the relationship.  
An additional step is taken in Table 7 to compare two models, one 
consisting of the sample in the Middle East and another consisting of established 
democracies, so that the predictive strength of the independent variables can be 
examined. 
 






Correlation coefficient (ρ) 
Egypt (n=2,936) -.047* 
Jordan (n=1,139) .069* 
Morocco (n=855) .233** 
Combined (n=4,930) .017* 
 
Notes: 
*-Significant at the .05 level 
**-Significant at the .01 level 
 
 
 In Table 7 the analysis shows that there is significance for both the model 
with Middle Eastern countries and also the model with democracies. There is a 
large difference in the sample size—over 140,000 responses for the aggregate 
democratic countries and 5,000 for the Middle East region—yet the disparity in 
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comparative size does not take away from interpreting the results. The p value is 
below .01 for the Middle East model, so it is significant. The predictor based on 
civic associationalism has strong significance (P<0.01), while the trusting variable 
does not have significance. Trust has a positive sign, but it’s not significant (p= 
.706), and thus assigning statistical value to the coefficient would not be advised, 
as it is a weak predictor for the model.  
 





















No. of Observations 4894 140311 
R2 .046 .402 
 
Notes: 
*-Significant at the .05 level 
**-Significant at the .01 level 
 
 
What’s striking and important to the comparison is that the R2 is much 
lower when compared to the model with established democracies. This value 
shows how much the two selected measurements of social capital can explain 
variance in the amount of political activity among respondents. In this linear 
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regression, a value of 1.0 means perfect prediction, while a value of 0 implies 
that knowledge of the social capital variables have no predictive value with 
regards to the model. Certainly, the value leaves much to be desired in the 
Middle East model. It is .046 there, while for the other model of democratic 
nations, it is .402, a much higher value. In terms of the predictors themselves, 
they both perform better in the model consisting of democratic nations, also. 
Civic associationalism has a value of .327 in the model. Trust has a positive 
coefficient, .471, and also has significance at the .01 level, which is not the case 
in the Middle East model. In other words, trust is a better predictor of political 
action in the model composed of non-Middle East countries. It carries a greater 
share of explanatory value, comparatively, when it comes to assessing the 
variance in political action by respondents. Similarly, civic associationalism 











 The most noticeable result emerging from the tables and figures above is 
the discrepancy in the amount of explanatory, predictive share found in the 
Middle Eastern model versus the model covering democracies. The directions of 
the two effects differ between models, also. Whereas prior studies of the 
hypothesized relationship between social capital in the form of trust and civic 
engagement have revealed a tight bond with political action, it is apparent that 
the two factors are not doing the same work in explaining variance in the Middle 
East. The results in the democratic model reinforce past observations that trust 
and civic associationalism work in concert inside democratic nations to influence 
political activity. The two predictors explain a substantial amount of variation, 
which can be interpreted as an indication that good democratic citizenship is 
predicated on trust in others and civic engagement. 
 Something entirely different is occurring in the Middle East model. This is 
in keeping with expectations regarding how social capital may work in 
authoritarian environments. It appears that even though there are people who 
have generalized trust and engage in civic pursuits by volunteering in public 
organizations, they do not take actions associated with political action. This might 
have to in part with the inertia pushing back against taking that next step. 
Putnam, Pharr and Dalton (2000) describe this as a “heavy rain” that prevents 
the all-important moment when social capital translates into democratic action. In 
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a sense, this becomes an overriding environmental factor. The strength of the 
environment constricts and prevents the full impact of social capital on political 
activity. Put simply, it may be that no matter how strongly individuals in the 
Middle East hold to the precepts of trusting others and extending themselves into 
civic pursuits, the authoritarian environment surrounding them may prove an 
insurmountable barrier. Poor confidence in being able to affect their governments 
and decades of dismal performance by authoritarian leadership may compound 
difficulties to the point where disenchantment overwhelms any possible stirring 
power of social capital. The propellant is thus washed out in the rain. 
 Returning to the vicious and virtuous circles, it is worth considering this 
split in light of how social trust and civic engagement in democracies came out so 
differently in the two models. Again, the argument is that higher levels of social 
capital can influence democratic performance through the way that generalized 
trust and widespread civic participation help to solidify the aggregation and 
articulation of popular sentiment (Putnam, 2000). When the circle is virtuous, as 
is the case in the model with developed democracies, trust and civic engagement 
feed back on themselves, leading to more democratic action. However when 
stocks of social capital are low, as they are in the Middle East model, the circle 
becomes vicious, and the reciprocal effects are no longer positive.    
 There is contextual evidence supporting this observation from other 
studies of social capital in non-democratic environments. Robteutscher (2002) 
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examined the quality of civic associationalism with regards to democratic ideals 
in an undemocratic environment, namely early twentieth-century Germany. He 
observes that the quasi-automatic assumption that proper, healthy, and 
efficiently-functioning civic associations have recognizable, positive influence on 
democracy in general is misleading. If the overall atmosphere is undemocratic to 
begin with, then the associative life itself will reflect this lack of overall 
democracy. It is true that the absence of associations would foreshadow 
dangerous warning signs for democratic culture, as extreme individualism and 
egocentrism are not conducive to democratic ideals. But, even with strong 
associations, there is always the consideration that they reflect general trends, 
and the trends were not democratic in Germany at the time, to say the least. In 
the case of the authoritarian states of the Middle East, just because there is 
sociability on some level in the form of civic participation does not seem to be 
causing any clamor for democracy, in a sense.  
 Stepping back again to the wider issue, there is still the matter of how 
much and to what extent associational enterprises can influence and inspire 
democratic ideals in the first place. This is part of a larger debate in the scholarly 
community, one that has already appeared when discussing political 
transformations in different regions of the world, for example post-Communist 
transformations in Eastern Europe or transitions to democracy throughout the 
Latin American region. The cleavage can be identified between arguments for a 
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hopeful view of the utility of social capital generated by associational 
engagement, and a less optimistic camp that remains unconvinced about the 





 In this final chapter, the analysis of the above data and findings will be 
summarized and examined. The formation of social capital and the investigation 
of the Middle East context will be discussed in light of the empirical results. Also, 
a summary of how the latest events must be considered with regards to 
formulating improvements to future research is included as part of the 
summation.  
Broadly speaking, there are several conceptual aspects to social capital 
that will be highlighting. The network features of social capital—how networks 
contribute to the accumulation of social capital, especially—are relevant 
considering the events of this year so far, the “Arab Spring” of 2011. Also, there 
is the matter of how the finer aspects of social capital can be best conceptualized 
and characterized in the future, considering how differently ideas such as civic 
associationalism can be reconsidered in an era where voluntary engagement can 
take many new, alternate forms, thanks to advances in online social interaction. 
 
Summary of Findings  
 Research into how social capital impacts political action in the Middle East 
is obviously going to expand considering recent events. In this paper, I have 
presented an analysis of how trust in others and civic associationalism predicts 
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the likelihood of political action in the Middle East. The substance of the results 
indicates that social capital does not work the same way in the authoritarian 
environments there as it does (or is expected to do) in other developed, well-
established democracies. To start with, this makes the question I raise in my 
introduction of how to aid the process of democratization a decidedly tough one. 
Even in the context of countries with healthy stores of social capital and solid 
histories of democracy, it would be hard to see what policy conclusions to take 
from an investigation of the causal relationships behind trust and democratic 
action. There are broad recommendations that can always be suggested—
improving education, directing funds to voluntary organizations, ensuring the 
proper, necessary legal background for trust to flourish—but these can be made 
independent of any advanced understanding of how the mechanisms of 
generalized trust and civic togetherness function. So, I can’t address conclusively 
how to break what appears to be a vicious cycle of low social capital and lack of 
broad political action in the Middle East. 
 Based on the findings, though, there are indications of how the 
analysis can be refined and further validated. It is apparent from the pallid 
connections between social capital and democratic action in the Middle East 
model that there are further details which require attention. The civic 
associationalism predictor was significant, so civic activity is producing some 
amount of explanatory impact in the regression model. If it isn’t raising propensity 
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for democratic action, though, then it may be that within the Middle Eastern 
countries a different quality of social capital is being produced in civic 
associations. The organizations flourishing there should be further examined. If 
they are cultivating the types of social bonds that are not cross-cutting and 
helping to bridge differences between people, then they might instead be 
producing social capital of the bad, “thick” variation. Putnam (2000) points out 
that it can be quite detrimental if the type of civic association only serves to 
reinforce narrow, heterogeneous membership and aims, and this may be the 
case within authoritarian countries of the Middle East. There simply may not be a 
wide enough base of civic associations, and this fact is crucial to the evaluation. 
Again, the connection between social capital and possible later developments is 
built upon a claim that, in its purest essence, trust breeds trust. The state can 
manufacture trust—and as often the case with authoritarian nations, they aim to 
do this exclusively—but it is the informal interaction that may occur in a sports 
league, book of the month club, or volunteer health organization that leads to 
greater trust and cooperation amongst strangers (Levi 1996). 
The trust component of the model itself requires amplification, then. Since 
it is not acting as a catalyst for political action according to the data—as is 
apparent by the poor job generalized trust does in explaining variance in the 
regression model—then it may not be producing healthy social capital. The “oil 
curse” and associated impediments to democratic action may be standing so 
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firmly in the way that social capital withers as a useful fuel for democratization. 
Jamal (2007) reflects upon this, pointing out that the severe restrictions on 
freedom and movement mightily impact the vitality of civic associations in the 
Arab region.  While organizations can survive in the context of wide-spread 
authoritarian repression, he observes that their actual impact on democratic 
action is hampered by the multiplicity of barriers arrayed against free expression 
and movement. There are other historical parallels to consider, as well. Just 
because there is active associational engagement within a society, built on 
widespread trust and reciprocity, does not mean that widespread, free flowing 
political action must result. Again, the impediments may be too large, especially 
within a constrictive overall setting. Consider that between the two World Wars, 
as mentioned earlier, there were hugely diverse and potent social organizations 
in Germany, organized from the top-down, covering every variety of family, sport, 
cultural, and social pursuit. And yet, as the organizations and the engagement 
were ultimately arranged for a single purpose, no matter how strong the linkages 
and growth in trust, it cannot be said that social capital had an independent, 
objective, positive impact by most observers (Berman 1997).  
In a way, social capital is a multiplier for possible good political action and 
possibly bad; or, put another way, high social capital doesn’t itself automatically, 
independently become the antidote for repression. Recall that in the WVS panel 
study the respondents were asked about their participation in a political 
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demonstration, which is used as part of the dependent variable in this study. A 
respondent may have participated in a demonstration with express political 
purposes—say a protest over a foreign policy issue, perhaps concerning the 
state of Israel or US involvement in the Middle East—but they may have done so 
on orders to do so.  In other words, independent social capital that could have 
contributed to political interest and desire to take action may have had little to do 
with it, and attendance at a demonstration may simply have been compulsory. 
 
Study Limitations and Future Research 
In order to further explain the puzzle, then, it would be necessary to open 
the details of social capital formation in the region up for inspection, as trust and 
civic engagement as operationalized by the WVS data do not stand alone in this 
investigation as the driving factors behind political action in nondemocratic 
environments. Rather, it appears that the stamina of the region’s long-standing 
authoritarian regimes remained undiluted in 2005, despite the social capital 
factors that are theorized to have such an important contribution to democratic 
societies.  
What appears to be different now, perhaps, and what has broken through, 
is the method and mode of social interaction. The data as addressed here was 
culled from a period before the onset of new, different types of social 
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collaboration that may not have been expressed during the first half of the 2000s. 
Specifically, the intensification of online social interaction through the Internet has 
been referred to as integral in discussions of why social protest arrived with such 
suddenness this year. This wasn’t necessarily an expectation or prediction, but 
there has been a growing amount of scholarly focus on the way the potent 
capabilities of social capital are amplified when the web is introduced as catalyst 
(Shirky  2008, Rheingold  2002). That being said, there are still those that argue 
against giving any sort of credence to the idea of blogging, tweeting, and 
Facebooking as total game-changers, and remind us that online culture for the 
most part remains transitory. To expand, the arguments against overloading on 
the importance of social media and online interaction center around the 
increasing shift away from engaging forms of networked communication to the 
generic, diary-like communication that encourage socializing online just for the 
sake of visibility and pseudo-celebrity. With regards to political expression, the 
argument is that online interaction thus becomes less about communication and 
informational discourse—the elements behind social capital—and more about 
bland broadcasting and phatic communication (Marwick and Boyd 2011; Grant et 
al 2010, Miller 2008).  
Even so, the concept deserves attention, and in the context of surveys of 
political behavior, it can be operationalized and added to such studies as the 
WVS used here. This is the major limitation of this research project, yet also the 
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most opportune area for testing the relevance of social capital developed through 
online media, as it were. Since each successive mass protest and revolution this 
year in the Middle East—starting with Algeria and spreading to almost every 
other country on the map in both directions—came after the widespread 
appearance of the Internet and online forms of social engagement, then the 
addition of this variable may prove helpful. I would suggest that the next panel of 
the WVS include just such a measurement, i.e. a survey question to elicit more 
information on whether civic engagement and trust developed through the use of 
social media has correlation with political action and subsequent 
democratization.  It may be further beneficial to inquire along these lines in order 
to learn how the vitality of online civic associationalism in the context of the 
Middle East might work differently. If we suppose that groups of interested 
citizens have online outposts where they can engage each other, learn to trust 
one another, go through the cycles of motivation and reciprocity that reinforce the 
strength of social capital, then that may inform the relationship between the 
variables addressed in this study. To be specific, I would form a question along 
these lines for use in the next wave of the WVS: 
I am going to read of a list of different social networking applications. For 
each, please respond if you have ever created a personal profile on the 
site: 1) Facebook 2)Twitter 3) MySpace 4) Google+    
The aim of such a question would be to gather data on social networking 
use. This would be an opening to then further tease out facets of group 
72 
 
membership and online political participation as measurements that can be 
considered alongside traditional scales of civic associationalism and generalized 
trust.  
What is opportune about recent events, also, is that they essentially 
provide a mass natural experiment from which to draw data. This introduces the 
opportunity to shift away from survey methods of inquiry, even beyond such 
broad comparative datasets such as the WVS. While it may not be possible to 
reproduce with absolute fidelity the motivations behind why so many individuals 
in the Middle East decided to take political action, it would be possible to 
reconstruct whether social capital influenced matters.  
As an experiment, it would be possible now to examine retrospectively 
whether generalized trust in others and a desire to join in public demonstrations 
and boycotts were identifiable as individuals began to engage each other through 
the Internet. The most direct way to do this is to examine what they themselves 
might have declared online, as data points can now be built based on what 
individuals themselves expressed day to day or even moment to moment as the 
revolutions built steam. Thankfully, with the increased adoption of social 
networking tools comes the increasing opportunity to collect people’s opinions, 
as they are often quite willing to offer it up, unprompted. Taking openly available 
information, it would be possible to ascertain what motivations were expressed 
by what segments of the Arab public, and at what point in each case; harvesting 
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this information would be a matter of searching and collecting, then analyzing 
and computing for content and sentiment (Shah and Yazdani 2011).  Certainly, 
there will be no shortage of new information emerging from the Middle East 
region on how social capital informs political action in the coming years, 
particularly social capital as expressed through new media. What is tantalizing 
about online social capital is that the technology itself affords certain self-
sustaining characteristics to the discussion. Online social interaction can be 
measure to exact seconds, and recorded and reviewed in a much more 
expansive fashion. Even if it’s largely anonymous, and there’s no guarantee of 
who anyone is in real life, there are still reputational aspects to online social 
interaction. In other words, it’s possible to know who you are communicating and 
collaborating with, as how much to trust them, based on someone’s standing 
within a virtual social network. Plus, in a way online social interaction can 
eliminate the roadblocks to social capital building in person. People don’t have to 
dress appropriately and judge or be judged by their fellow group members, for 
example. They can meet online, at any time of the day, and the various issues 
that may impede interaction in person become less of a concern when there is 
zero sensory interaction going on (Resnick 2002). People can choose to 
participate fully in an online social group without ever needing to disclose a single 
thing about themselves, something that just isn’t possible when they have to 
meet and organize in person (Ellison and Lampe 2007).  
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In terms of baseline demographics, the presence of online social venues 
is highly relevant to an examination of the Middle East region. There is today one 
consistent feature of this part of the world: in every country, there are far more 
young people under the age of 30 than there are older citizens, and amongst 
these youth, there are far higher levels of education. Following that, there is a 
widespread, vocal desire amongst these members of society for greater 
opportunity and access to employment, advancement, and an overall stake in the 
future of their respective nations. Many of these youths are also become well-
versed in online social media as communication tools, and are learning to 
interact online in new and different ways. To clarify, there is a distinction between 
surveying individuals and teasing out their commitment to volunteering for 
organizations and their trust in others and on the other hand how they might 
engage each other online. However, there is an opportunity to capture the 
motivations of those who might contribute to and benefit from social capital even 
if they don’t do it in a traditional manner. Put another way, there will always be 
people who are joiners and volunteers, as trite as it is to note this, and there are 
people who aren’t (Klesner 2007). What’s more, the people who aren’t 
necessarily quick to join up and volunteer traditionally, in person (who may be the 
smart ones, considering the dangers of doing so in an authoritarian setting) may 
be taking their activity online, where their activity can be assessed and examined 
in a similar manner. It bears repeating that the primary, bold type concept behind 
the social capital argument is that it does not matter what form of group 
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participation is taking place. Rather, if it’s happening, period, then it may be 
hypothesized that it contributes to greater things down the road, as membership 
in any form of organization builds the type of collective vitality that can lead to 
wider political action.  
There are many ways in which this has happened in the Middle East, 
during the so called “Arab Spring” of the first half of 2011. Speaking broadly, the 
online engagement and collaboration came about and was sustained through a 
multitude of virtual venues. There were collaborative initiatives, of the sort where 
individuals could participate anonymously and in a turn-by-turn fashion to 
strategizing their political action. Early on during the Egyptian protests, groups of 
individuals began to share open Google documents containing protest tactics 
and demands. Crucially, these declarations and strategy resources could be 
edited by anyone, at any time, and they were not traceable or identifiable with a 
single person or group (Wolman 2011). There were also many blogs, a basic 
type of content-sharing tool authored and controlled by a  single source but 
available to multiple users, and again—crucially—a type of focal point for virtual 
engagement. Most importantly during the Arab Spring, these blogs became 
heavily video-based, beyond just text and article types of reports. For example, 
soon after Libyan rebels took hold of the “second capital” of Benghazi, a blog 
appeared with daily video updates of events within the city. In effect, this blog 
became a de facto TV broadcast, even providing instant video transmissions 
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when available (Wells 2011). Again, this was all anonymous, decentralized, and 
openly available, which afforded the opportunity for other interested individuals to 
comment, contribute, maybe even just observe, but again, build the sort of social 
interaction and trust that may (or may not) have contributed to further political 
action. On a slightly more complex level, there was also the presence of so many 
social networking users during these events, average citizens on Facebook, 
Twitter, MySpace, and the like. Now, the relationship to be examined here isn’t 
just that they went online to these sites to learn about the protests, or where and 
when to engage in them. Instead, the question is whether before there were even 
any discussions of protesting, whether or not their engagement with fellow 
citizens over groups and common interests that had nothing to do with politics 
served as a test process for consequent action.  
It is possible to assess whether the advantages of online social networking 
are consistent with expectations of what traditional models of social engagement 
might offer (in other words, the social clubs, civic groups, and community 
organizations referred to in the social capital literature). The Internet allows for a 
different way of organizing and engaging, with less cost and trouble, and in the 
case of authoritarian environments, with less risk and personal danger. It is 
plausible and reasonable, then, to study how new tools and information outposts 
might replicate the mechanisms of traditional social capital formation.  
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Previous researchers have engaged this question. Skoric et al (2009) 
examined the relationship between online social capital and political activity, 
albeit in a different part of the world, amongst the citizens of Singapore. Despite 
the regional difference, though, Singapore is actually a fairly useful area in which 
to make a comparison, as there are considerable restrictions on civil and political 
activity. Skoric et al first established that there were densely knit communities of 
Singaporeans online, and there were noticeable levels of group awareness of 
identity. Crucially, bonding online serves an important role, they find. There are 
the organizational and mobilization aspects, certainly, but there’s also the matter 
of rejuvenation, in a sense. The new forms of sociability over the Internet 
translate into real life, even if they only appear initially in a supplementary 
fashion. However, this again is what Putnam and other theorists propose, that 
even if a bowling league doesn’t have much to do with healthy political 
engagement, on the face of things, it does in fact matter. 
Similarly, Feezell et al (2009) have evaluated online social networking to 
see if online interaction translates into offline activity. They evaluate the Groups 
functionality of Facebook specifically, to see how they might foster political 
engagement. They find that in terms of utility, online group activity can and does 
mirror what one might expect from traditional civic associationalism. The 
applications built for Facebook use involve similar uses and serve similar 
purposes, for example with regards to information gathering and exchange of 
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ideas, just as real-world groups might. Certainly, there may be shortfalls when 
the quality and stock of deliberative discussion, say, is examined between the 
online and real worlds. Using content analysis, they find that online interaction 
can often times lack a certain coherence and substance. Still, they conclude that 
being a political participant in this new era can and will have much to do with 
these new forms of interaction. 
As shown by recent events, the newly-available social spaces accessible 
to citizens of Middle East countries afforded opportunities for discussion, 
engagement, dissent, and eventually in-person protest. It is too early to see how 
this will all end up, historically speaking, but the opportunities for study are great. 
The combined variables of political action and social capital as is traditionally 
theorized can be successfully joined in the context of the Middle East for further 
investigation and exploration, as shown by this study. This serves as an 
appropriate starting point, also, from which to further investigate how new forms 










  Frequency Total Percent 
 0 376 4.6 
2 533 6.5 
3 5117 62.8 
4 183 2.2 
5 376 4.6 
6 209 2.6 
7 114 1.4 
8 91 1.1 
Valid 6999 85.9 
Missing  1153 14.1 












 0 4501 55.2 
1 331 4.1 
2 361 4.4 
3 71 .9 
4 81 1.0 
5 18 .2 
6 32 .4 
7 3 .0 
8 11 .1 
9 2 .0 
10 6 .1 
11 2 .0 
12 1 .0 
13 1 .0 
15 1 .0 
16 7 .1 
Valid 5429 66.6 
Missing  2723 33.4 














Can´t be too 
careful 
5838 71.6 
Total 7968 97.7 
Missing  184 2.3 
















Incomplete secondary school: 
technical/vocational type 
323 4.0 









Some university without 
degree/Higher education - 
lower-level 
349 4.3 
University with degree/Higher 
education - upper-level tertiary 
868 10.6 
Total 8129 99.7 
Missing  23 .3 
Total 8152 100.0 
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